Recent results have indicated that categorization is influenced not only by the observed members of a category but also by prior knowledge (e.g., Hayes, Taplin, & Munro, 1996; Kaplan & Murphy, 2000; Palmeri & Blalock, 2000; Spalding & Murphy, 1996; Wattenmaker, 1995; Wisniewski & Medin, 1994 ; see Heit, 1997 , for a review). These studies have extended the range of categorization research compared to numerous experiments that have focused solely on the impact of observed category members. This paper is intended to extend the range of categorization research even further by looking at how verbal arguments are incorporated into category learning. For example, a job applicant being recruited by an ambitious company might make observations of the workplace and the people there, but these observations could be accompanied by verbal arguments about why it is a good place to work and why it is better than other places. These arguments could present information (such as regarding employment benefits at this company) that would not be available from direct observations. In some situations, arguments could be used to contradict people's prior knowledge. For example, trainee counselors could be taught that contrary to popular belief, shy people often attend parties as an attempt to mask their shyness.
The specific approach in this paper will be to apply a mathematical model of categorization that has origins in the artificial category learning literature (Medin & Schaffer, 1978) and has been applied to some influences of prior knowledge on categorization (Heit, 1994 (Heit, , 1998 (Heit, , 2001 . Can this existing model also address how verbal arguments affect category learning? The working hypothesis will be that arguments are processed the same way as other kinds of prior knowledge. That is, the information available at the start of learning will be subject to the same processing whether this information comes from people's long-term beliefs or whether this information was recently presented in paragraph form. One consequence of this hypothesis is that verbally presented arguments should have comparable qualitative effects to other forms of prior knowledge.
What cognitive processes are involved in putting together prior knowledge and observations of category members? From the work of Heit (1994 Heit ( , 1998 a theoretical account of some of these processes has emerged. This account distinguishes between integration and selective weighting processes. For illustration, imagine someone taking a new job at an extremely prestigious research institute. This person knows the reputation of the research institute and its members, and now has an opportunity to make direct observations and form an accurate representation. The question is how will prior knowledge (the reputation) and observations be put together. The integration process refers to how prior knowledge serves as an initial representation, which is subsequently revised as new observations are made. In the Verbal Arguments 4 present example, the initial representation would be very favorable, e.g., it would be initially assumed that everyone is very hard-working. In Heit's (1994) model of integration, prior knowledge was represented as being equivalent to a fixed number of observations. In contrast, the weighting process refers to how new observations themselves are treated. Do some observations count more than others? For example, if people are expected to be hardworking, would an observation of a lazy person have more or less impact than an observation of a hard-working person? This is a crucial issue for virtually all models of categorization that work from a representation that stores or summarizes observed category members.
It appears that integration processes are mandatory, in that they affect category learning even under difficult (e.g., fast) learning conditions. Weighting processes are optional and strategic. Under easier (e.g., slower) learning conditions, people can apply processes that lead to selective weighting in favor of category members that are incongruent with previous expectations. Thus the lazy person at the research institute would have a greater effect on the emerging category representation than a hard-working person. This account is closely linked to research on how stereotypes affect memory (e.g., Bargh & Thein, 1985; Hastie, 1980; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Schloerscheidt, & Milne, 1999; Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993) . These studies suggest that an automatic processing mode is sufficient for ordinary observations, but more controlled, effortful processing is required for responding to unusual or incongruent observations.
The main purpose of this paper is provide converging evidence for this theoretical account by applying it to the novel issue of how people incorporate verbal arguments into category learning. Information that is supplied before any observations are made should act as another kind of prior knowledge, and hence the account developed by Heit (1994 Heit ( , 1998 should apply to this information as well. Therefore, verbally presented arguments, like other forms of prior knowledge, should have different effects under faster versus slower learning conditions.
In both category learning experiments presented here, subjects were presented with verbal arguments related to some of the categories, such as a statement explaining why some shy people might actually attend a lot of parties. In Experiment 1, subjects learned under relatively fast-paced conditions (3.5 s per description). It was predicted that, relative to observations, verbal arguments would have a statistically independent effect on categorization, just as prior knowledge did in previous experiments (Heit, 1994) , but working in the opposite direction. Experiment 2 used a much slower-paced learning procedure, with knowledge has two distinct influences on categorization. First, prior knowledge provides an initial set of expectations, as represented in the integration model by a set of prior examples.
Second, category members that are incongruent with prior knowledge are highlighted, and have a greater influence on categorization than theory-congruent category members. The hypothesis behind Experiment 2 was that verbal arguments would again act like prior knowledge, having two distinct effects on categorization.
Experiment 1
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to counteract the pattern of prior knowledge effects with verbal arguments that went against usual expectations. For example, if subjects read an explanation for why shy people might actually attend a lot of parties, then thinking about this explanation might serve to neutralize the effect of subjects' prior beliefs about shy people. In Experiment 1, the additional information was provided for half the categories, hence the presence or absence of this information was completely under experimental control, unlike the prior knowledge that subjects bring to an experiment.
There were three specific hypotheses for this experiment, following from the idea that arguments could be treated as equivalent in influence to a fixed number of observations. First, it was predicted that the effect of arguments on categorization should be independent of the effect of observations, just as Heit (1994) found that the effect of prior knowledge was independent of the effect of observations. Second, it was predicted that the arguments would reduce the effects of prior knowledge overall, relative to the standard condition without arguments. Third, it was expected that the integration model would fit the results well, representing the impact of the arguments as being equivalent to some number of observations.
Method
Overview. The subjects observed 160 descriptions of people in City S, a fictional city in England. The descriptions were quite simple; for example, somebody might be described with shy and does not attend parties often. The descriptions were presented individually. In effect, subjects were learning about contextualized categories, such as shy people in City S.
Following the study phase, subjects made transfer judgments on additional descriptions of people in City S. For example, subjects were given the description of another person in City S who does not attend parties often, and they had to judge the likelihood that this person would fall into the shy category. Subjects were presented with verbal arguments for half the Verbal Arguments 6 couplets. For example, some subjects were presented the argument that shy people might actually attend quite a lot of parties, as a means of overcoming their shyness. These arguments were presented before the category members themselves. The subjects read one argument at a time, then rated its convincingness on a numerical scale. The main purpose of collecting ratings was to ensure that the subjects would read the arguments and think about them.
It is best to think of the experiment in terms of the design of the test phase, which had three independent variables. First, half the questions involved the pairing of a description with a category that was congruent according to prior knowledge, such as does not attend parties often and shy. And half the questions involved an incongruent pairing, such as owns a railway season ticket and does not travel by train often. The second variable was presentation frequency, with five possible levels: 12.5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 87.5%. These values refer to the proportion of times, out of eight training examples with the description, that the example fell into the category. For example, there might have been eight training examples with the does not attend parties often description; of these two may have been listed as shy (and six as not shy). Hence the presentation frequency in this case would be 25%. The third variable was whether the subject was provided an argument, relevant to these stimuli.
Subjects. Sixty-four University of Warwick students participated for course credit or a small payment.
Stimuli. The training examples were derived from a set of descriptive terms, shown in Table 1 . In total, there were ten couplets of four features. In the table, each couplet of four features is comprised of two pairs of opposites or complements. The stimuli were pre-tested on other University of Warwick students to validate this manipulation of congruence with prior knowledge (as in Heit, 1994 , Appendix A).
1 A verbal argument was prepared for each of the 10 couplets in Table 1 . The aim of the argument was to explain why various incongruent features might actually go together after all. Four sample arguments, out of the total set of 10, are shown in Table 2 .
For each subject, the ten couplets were assigned randomly to the following schema.
Each descriptive term appeared in eight training examples, with each example consisting of two pieces of information. For half the couplets, an argument was presented, and for the remaining half, there was no argument. Two couplets, one from the argument condition and one from the standard condition, were assigned to each of the following structures. Each test question in the transfer phase was a conditional probability judgment, referring to the probability of one feature given another feature. The first experimental variable was whether the two features were congruent or incongruent with each other, according to prior knowledge. The second variable was the conditional probability of presentation during the study phase: 12.5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, or 87.5%. The third experimental variable was whether arguments had been presented. Eight test questions were derived from each of the 10 couplets, thus there were 80 test questions.
Procedure. All information was displayed on a computer screen. The procedure consisted of four parts. First, subjects were given the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the stimuli. The features in Table 1 were shown together for 3 min, in a different random order for each subject. The subjects were simply instructed to look over the stimuli.
Second, the subjects read five arguments, rating each one for convincingness. The instructions were as follows:
After seeing all this descriptive information, you probably have some expectations about how these traits may go together. Just as you might expect that working as a professional engineer and reading science fiction novels would tend to go together, you might believe certain pairs of the facts that you just read would tend to go together. We have asked other people for their opinions, and we would like to know whether you agree with them.
The verbal arguments were presented one at a time, for subjects to read at their own pace.
After each argument was presented, subjects rated it on a scale from 1 (not at all convincing) to 7 (very convincing).
Next, at the start of the training phase, subjects were told that they would see a number of descriptions of persons living in City S, a city located in England. In the training phase, each subject saw the 160 person descriptions, each containing two features, displayed Verbal Arguments 8 in a random order, one at a time for 3.5 s. There was a brief gap between displays (0.2 s)
during which the computer screen was cleared. The training phase was followed by a 1 min break.
Finally, in the test phase, participants made 80 conditional probability estimates. The test questions for each subject were presented in a random order. These questions were worded as in the following example:
Consider a person from City S with the following characteristic: shy How likely is it that this person would also have this characteristic? attends parties often.
The subjects responded by typing integers on a scale from 0% to 100%. They were told to base their answers on what they inferred to be true of persons in City S after having seen descriptions of some of the citizens of City S.
The training phase used an unsupervised learning procedure in which subjects simply observed cases and learned without further feedback. In the test phase, characteristics were treated (in the experimental design) as both predicting features and category labels. For example, subjects were given the shy feature and asked to judge the likelihood of the attends parties often category, and were also given the attends parties often feature and asked to judge the likelihood of the shy category. (See also Heit, 2001 , for applications of the integration model to more conventional designs in which there is a sharper distinction between features and category labels and in which subjects classify based on multiple features.)
Results
Argument ratings. The subjects found the arguments to be moderately convincing, with an overall mean rating of 4.43 on a 7-point scale. Although this number may seem a bit low, it should be pointed out that the arguments all contradicted people's prior beliefs about stimuli that had been chosen to elicit strong beliefs. The mean ratings for individual arguments ranged from 3.77 to 5.11.
Probability estimates. The results of Experiment 1, in terms of the average probability estimate for each type of test question, are shown in Figure 1 , separately for the standard condition--without arguments--and the argument condition. Congruent test questions refer to conditional probability judgments between features that are congruent with each other according to prior knowledge, such as the conditional probability of a person who does not Verbal Arguments 9 attend parties often being shy. Incongruent test questions refer to probability judgments between features that are incongruent with each other according to prior knowledge, such as the conditional probability of a person who smiles less than average being usually happy.
There are a few observations to be made from Figure 1 . First, in the standard condition, the parallel-lines pattern is similar to the results of comparable experiments in Heit (1994, 1998) , showing independent influences of observations and prior knowledge. Second, in the argument condition, the congruent and incongruent lines are still parallel, but closer together, suggesting that the effect of prior knowledge had been comparatively reduced.
Finally, although the arguments did serve to reduce the prior knowledge effect, there is still a substantial difference between the congruent condition and the incongruent condition.
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) supported these observations. There was a main effect of congruent versus incongruent test question, F(1, 62) = 76.85, p < .001, MSe = 1723, with higher probability judgments overall for congruent questions. Also, there was a main effect of presentation frequency, F(4, 248) = 18.71, p < .001, MSe = 245, with higher probability judgments when presented proportions were higher. There was no significant effect of condition (standard or argument), F(1,74) = 0.31, MSe = 76, suggesting that the average probability estimates were about the same for the two conditions. Most critically, the interaction between congruence and condition was significant, F(1, 62) = 16.76, p < .001, MSe = 244, fitting with the observation that the effect of theory congruence was reduced in the argument condition relative to the standard condition. There was no significant two-way interaction between presentation frequency and the other two variables, and likewise the three-way interaction was not statistically significant.
Model-based analyses. Next, the results were analyzed in terms of a categorization model. Unlike the ANOVA, which looked at individuals' responses, the model was applied to average responses at the group level. In particular, the integration model of Heit (1994) was applied to the results, taking into account subjects' prior knowledge, the observed category members, and the arguments when presented. The model is presented in detail in the Appendix. What is most critical is that the integration model has a free parameter G which represents the strength of prior knowledge. Prior knowledge and observations are simply added together to make a judgment, so that the numerical value of G can be interpreted as being equivalent to some number of observations. For example, if G is 5, then prior knowledge has the equivalent impact of 5 observations. The categorization model also has another free parameter, s, indicating the degree of memory confusions (Medin & Schaffer, 1978) . The value of s is in the range from 0 to 1, with higher values of s indicating worse memory.
2
The integration model was applied to the data from both the standard and argument conditions together. It was assumed that in the standard condition, subjects would be influenced by their prior knowledge, reflected by the G parameter, as well as by the observed category members. In the argument condition, subjects would be influenced by prior knowledge, represented by the same value of G, by observed category members, and by the argument, with a strength given by the parameter T. (See the Appendix for further details.)
The G parameter, representing strength of prior knowledge, was estimated to be 11.9. The T parameter, representing the strength of the argument, was estimated to be 2.6. Finally, the s parameter was estimated to be .43.
The root mean square error (RMSE) of this model fit was quite low, .0123. The predictions of the integration model are shown as the lines in Figure 1 , superimposed over the data points. Notably, the model captures the difference between congruent and incongruent test questions in the standard condition, and it also reflects the reduced effect of prior knowledge in the argument condition.
Discussion
The results supported all the experimental hypotheses. That is, both verbal arguments and prior knowledge had opposing effects on categorization, not interacting with presentation frequency. Relative to the standard condition, the effects of prior knowledge were reduced in the argument condition, in an overall manner predicted by the integration model. These results give converging evidence for the theoretical account developed in Heit (1994 Heit ( , 1998 , and perhaps most important, these results extend the domain of categorization models to account for effects of verbal arguments.
The finding that arguments can be treated as equivalent to a fixed number of observations, with an additive influence on judgments, is informative about the role of arguments in reasoning. According to the integration account, the arguments have a fixed impact on people's beliefs, reducing the prior knowledge effect uniformly in Figure 1 .
Another possibility would be that arguments simply have a cueing effect, not actually changing subjects' beliefs but merely letting them know that some observations may be different than expected, facilitating the use of this information. If this were the case, then arguments might be expected to have a greater impact in some conditions than others, e.g., arguments should have a greater impact when the observations are 87.5% incongruent compared to when the observations are only 12.5% incongruent. However, again, the fixed effect of arguments in Figure 1 rules out this explanation.
Interestingly, the effect of prior knowledge was fairly large in this experiment, compared to previous experiments with similar designs. The strength of the prior knowledge effect in the standard condition was estimated to be equivalent to 11.9 prior examples. The exact value of G should not be taken too literally in comparing experiments that had somewhat different designs and that were run on different subjects, but the value of 11.9 is higher than that estimated in any comparable previous experiment in this series. Compared to Heit (1994, Experiments 1-4) , Heit (1995) , Heit (1998, Experiments 1-3) , and several unpublished pilot experiments, the effect of prior knowledge in the present experiment was the highest--past estimates of G have been in the range of 1 to 7. However, in a replication of Experiment 1, using a similar procedure including the presentation of arguments, the estimated value of G was approximately 8. So there is not strong evidence that presenting arguments has a quantitative effect on the strength of prior knowledge effects Experiment 2 Heit (1998) found that when training occurs at a slower pace, with more than 10 s per observation, there was an interaction between the two variables of interest, with the effect of prior knowledge being reduced for mixed observations (near the 50% range) compared to unmixed observations (near the 0% and 100% range). The parallel-lines pattern illustrated by Figure 1 is replaced by two curved lines, closer to each other in the 50% region. Applying models to this curved pattern suggested a greater influence of incongruent observations compared to congruent observations. Hence it was concluded that under slower learning conditions, prior knowledge has two distinct influences. First, there is an integration effect such that prior knowledge has an influence equivalent to a fixed number of observations. Second, there is also a selective weighting effect, favoring incongruent category members.
The main purpose of Experiment 2 was to provide converging evidence for this account, applying it to verbally presented arguments. Whereas in Experiment 1 the study times were brief (less than 4 s per category member), in Experiment 2 the study time was 16 s for each category member. In the first experiment, the efficacy of verbal arguments in reducing prior knowledge effects helped to support the idea that under fast learning conditions, prior knowledge has a simple main effect on categorization judgments. For Experiment 2, the question of interest was whether arguments could reduce both prior knowledge effects that have been observed with slower-paced learning procedures, integration and selective weighting. It was expected that the arguments would act like prior knowledge, and hence also have two influences, but working in the opposite direction to the prior knowledge. Thus it was predicted that both influences of prior knowledge would be counteracted by the arguments.
Method
Overview. Experiment 2 was similar to Experiment 1, in that subjects were presented with arguments before they observed descriptions of residents of City S. The main change was category members were presented in the manner of Heit (1998) : Subjects saw a smaller number of person descriptions (40), with more information in each description (a name and four other characteristics), and these descriptions were presented at a much slower pace (16 s per item). Heit (1998, Experiment 2) found that study time was the key variable for encouraging optional selective weighting processes; the other changes in the materials were not sufficient to lead to selective weighting. However, the number and length of person descriptions were also patterned after Heit (1998) to maximize the chance of finding selective weighting.
Subjects. Fifty-three University of Warwick students participated for course credit or a small payment.
Stimuli. Each training example was a description of a person in terms of a name and four characteristics. For example, someone was named H Eccles, was shy, did not attend parties often, traveled frequently by train, and owned a railway season ticket. The forty names (first initial and surname) were chosen at random from the Coventry, Nuneaton, and Rugby (England) telephone directory.
The forty training examples were constructed from the features in Table 1 For each pair of couplets assigned to the same level of congruency, one was selected to have arguments presented. For example, when the shyness/parties couplet and the traffic accidents/car insurance couplet were both assigned to the 100% congruent condition, one of them, say the shyness/parties couplet, had an argument presented, and the other did not.
What is most critical is the design of the test stimuli, with three within-subject factors.
Each test question was a conditional probability judgment for a pair of features taken from a couplet in Table 1 , referring to the probability of one feature given another feature. The first experimental variable was whether the two features were congruent or incongruent with each other, according to prior knowledge. The second variable was the actual conditional probability, for the two features, of presentation during the study phase: 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, The order of these four features was determined randomly for each display, with the constraint that related features (e.g., shy and does not attend parties) were kept adjacent to each other.
Results
Argument ratings. The subjects found the arguments to be moderately convincing, with an overall mean rating of 4.26 on a 7-point scale. The mean ratings for individual arguments ranged from 3.23 to 5.00. An ANOVA supported these observations. There was a main effect of congruent versus incongruent test question, F(1, 52) = 22.71, p < .001, MSe = 1353, with higher probability judgments overall for congruent questions. Also, there was a main effect of presentation frequency, F(4, 208) = 91.83, p < .001, MSe = 382, with higher probability judgments when presented proportions were higher. There was no significant effect of condition (standard or argument), F(1,74) = 0.07, MSe = 68, suggesting that the average probability estimates were about the same for the two conditions. More critically, the interaction between congruence and condition was significant, F(1, 52) = 4.33, p < .05, MSe = 362, fitting with the observation that the fixed effect of theory congruence was reduced in the argument condition relative to the standard condition. Also, there was an interaction between condition and presentation frequency, F(4, 208) = 11.58, p < .001, MSe = 155, suggesting that subjects were differently sensitive to the observed category members in the two conditions. The final two analyses addressed the differential effect of prior knowledge at different levels of presentation frequency, which is relevant to selective weighting. The interaction between congruence and presentation frequency did not quite reach statistical significance, F(4, 208) = 2.07, p < .09, MSe = 258, but this result should be interpreted in light of the three-way interaction, between these two variables and condition, which is more relevant. This three-way interaction reached the level of statistical significance, F(4, 208) = 2.91, p < .05, MSe = 161, suggesting that the interaction between congruence and presentation frequency was different in the standard and argument conditions.
For a further look at this interaction, data from the standard and argument conditions were examined separately, with additional analyses previously used in Heit (1998) . For each condition, difference scores were computed representing the prior knowledge effect, or difference between congruent and incongruent judgments, at a given level of presentation. In terms of each panel in Figure 2 , these difference scores were equivalent to the signed distance between the two lines, taken at the 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% levels of presentation. For the initial model application, separate W parameters were estimated to measure the degree of weighting in the standard and argument conditions. The G parameter was used to measure the strength of prior knowledge, and the T parameter measured the strength of the argument, both in terms of an equivalent number of observations. In addition, a single value of the s parameter, representing memory confusions, was estimated for both conditions, as in the previous experiments. This model application was fairly successful, with an RMSE of .0181. However, it was clear that there was a systematic discrepancy between the data points and the model's predictions. Namely, compared to the model's predictions, people's estimates were more sensitive to observed proportion in the standard condition, and less sensitive to observed proportion in the argument condition. That is, the model seemed to get the slope of the lines somewhat wrong, compared to the data points in Figure 2 . This finding suggested that subjects were differentially sensitive to observed category members in the two conditions, a result also suggested by the ANOVA, particularly the interaction between condition and presentation frequency.
In an effort to capture this trend, the model was fitted again with two separate s Additional analyses were conducted to establish the level of statistical significance for the estimates of W (see Heit, 1998) . Two additional, restricted models were fit to the data.
For one model, the degree of weighting for the standard condition was fixed at 1, i.e., there was no selective weighting. This model had an RMSE of .0194, which was significantly worse than the model which allowed for selective weighting in the standard condition, χ2 (1) = 38.32, p < .001. Hence it appears that selective weighting made a statistically significant contribution in the standard condition. Next, a model was applied that fixed the degree of weighting in the argument condition to 1. This model had an RMSE of .0060, which was not significantly worse than the model which allowed for selective weighting in the argument condition, χ2 (1) = 0.77. Hence there was no evidence for a weighting component in the argument condition. (Likewise, using comparable analyses, there was no evidence at all for selective weighting in Experiment 1.)
Discussion
The results fit well with predictions as well as past findings. As in previous experiments (Heit, 1998) with slower-paced learning procedures, in the standard condition the modeling revealed two effects of prior knowledge: a fixed effect due to initial estimates as well as selective weighting of incongruent category members. Thus the standard condition was a useful replication of previous results. These findings were also supported at the individual-subject level by the ANOVA and trend analysis.
Also, as predicted, the arguments acted like prior knowledge, but working in the opposite direction. That is, the arguments reduced the fixed effect of prior knowledge represented by the G parameter, by providing a number T of counterexamples working in the opposite direction. Likewise, the arguments eliminated the selective weighting of incongruent category members represented by the W parameter--in the argument condition it was estimated that there was no selective weighting of category members at all. These results provide converging evidence for the theoretical account developed in Heit (1994 Heit ( , 1998 , suggesting that there are indeed two distinct influences of prior knowledge under slower learning conditions.
Although it had not been expected that modeling the results would require different values of the s parameter, representing memory confusions, for the standard and argument conditions, this result is easy to accommodate in terms of the arguments leading to worse overall learning of related category members, compared to category members which did not have arguments presented. There was not significant evidence for this difference in Experiment 1, but possibly Experiment 2 was more sensitive to variation in memory for observations due to the greater time of presentation per item. Furthermore, the issue of memory confusions is separate from the other issues addressed by the analyses, and does not detract from the overall qualitative pattern of results. The other differences between the standard and argument conditions in Experiment 2 are more important, namely that arguments led to a reduction in both influences of prior knowledge, a fixed effect equivalent to some number of observations as well as an effect of selective weighting. In sum, the within-experiment comparisons clearly showed that prior knowledge itself had two distinct effects, and arguments acted like prior knowledge but worked in the opposite direction, serving to reduce both of these effects.
General Discussion
These experiments provided converging evidence for the theoretical account of prior knowledge effects developed in Heit (1994 Heit ( , 1998 . Under faster-paced learning conditions in Experiments 1, verbal arguments had a fixed influence on categorization, equivalent to some number of observed category members. Under slower learning conditions in Experiment 2, verbal arguments also had a second effect, affecting the selective weighting of category members.
Much of what we learn about categories is learned not by direct observation of category members but conveyed through language such as in written explanations, conversations, and arguments. Until now, this kind of information has also been out of the bounds of categorization models, a situation bearing some similarity to the case of prior knowledge also being excluded from most categorization modeling efforts. Indeed, it was observed that verbal arguments acted much like subjects' own prior knowledge in terms of qualitative influences. These results support the hypothesis that verbally presented arguments can be treated in the same way as other forms of prior knowledge, from the perspective of applying categorization models.
The present modeling efforts revealed a few novel results regarding the influences of verbal arguments. First, in Experiment 1 it was observed that arguments changed people's beliefs (as well as could be observed from their judgments) in a similar way to observations.
That is, the arguments did not simply prepare people for contradictory evidence, but they actually served as contradictory evidence. Second, in Experiment 2, it was possible to determine whether the arguments act more like observations or more like a person's prior knowledge, because in this experiment these two sources of information had different qualitative effects. It was discovered that verbal arguments actually acted more like people's own knowledge. Verbal arguments not only changed beliefs, but they also affected the way 
Description of Categorization Models
The integration model of categorization is an exemplar-based account which extends the model of Medin and Schaffer (1978) . The main difference is that the representation of a category includes not only observed category members but also includes prior knowledge in the form of prior examples. Exemplar models are based on Equation 1, which describes classifying a stimulus, x, as a member of either category A or category B. similarities of x to each member of B retrieved from memory. Here, the similarity between two identical stimuli, sim(x,x), is assigned the value of 1, and the similarity between x and a mismatching stimulus y, sim(x,y), is assigned a fractional value s, where 0 <= s < 1. This implementation of the sim function is a special case of the multiplicative similarity rule of Medin and Schaffer (1978) for stimuli described by a single feature. The free parameter s measures the ability of a subject to discriminate between stimuli retrieved from memory.
When s is 0, memory discrimination is perfect and mismatching stimuli have no effect on categorization.
Finally, Equations 2a and 2b may be substituted into Equation 1, leading to Equation 3, which is the basic model applied in this paper.
In fitting this model to Experiments 1 and 2, it was assumed that an additional number, G, of prior examples would be represented in each category. Consider judgments when description x is expected to be in category A and description y is expected to be in In the pre-test with 24 additional subjects, the average probability estimate for incongruent pairings in Table 1 , e.g., shy and attends parties often, was 25%, and the average estimate for congruent pairings, e.g., generous and donates to charity, was 75%.
2 In addition, the average responses in each experiment were adjusted by a calibration parameter. Subjects in these experiments showed a slight lack of calibration, such that complementary probabilities added to somewhat more than 100% (see also Heit, 1994 Heit, , 1998 .
For example, the average response in Experiment 1 was 52.3%. To compensate for this lack of calibration, a value (here of .023) was subtracted from each response.
3 The nested models were compared using the technique of Borowiak (1989) . In brief, when model A is a nonlinear model with a free parameters estimated using a least-squares criterion, and B is a restricted version of this model with b free parameters, the likelihood ratio statistic is λ = (RSS A / RSS B ) (k/2) , where RSS is the residual sum of squares of the model and k is the number of data points to be predicted (here, 20). Borowiak showed that -2 ln (λ) has a χ2 distribution with (a -b) degrees of freedom. (See Heit, 1998, and Rotello and Heit, 1999, for other applications of this technique.) Table 2 Examples of Arguments Despite the common conception that shy people do not attend parties often, and that un-shy people frequently attend parties, there are many people who do not fall into either of these categories. Many shy people are only shy around strangers; thus they might frequently attend parties of their friends. Shy people may also go to parties in an attempt to overcome their shyness and to meet new people. Conversely, people who are not shy do not always attend parties often. Such people generally have many interests and hobbies, and may be too busy to attend parties often. Also, having an outgoing nature does not necessarily mean that a person will like parties; they may prefer other forms of entertainment.
Although you might think that people who have high car insurance rates would also have more traffic accidents than average, this may not always be the case. Because they have higher car insurance rates, many people become more careful when driving. Additionally, certain groups of people, such as teenagers, are automatically given high insurance rates, even though they may not ever have a car accident. Similarly, people who have lower car insurance rates do not always have fewer traffic accidents than average, because they might become less careful when driving.
Contrary to popular belief, people who attend football matches regularly do not always buy football team clothing. Football team clothing is expensive, and many people may prefer to spend their money on attending an actual game. Also, many people go to small local matches, and so do not buy the clothing associated with big-name football teams. People who do not attend football matches regularly do, however, often buy football team clothing. Often, people who are interested in football are unable to attend actual games because of constraints such as time, money, and location of matches. They may instead show their support of their favorite teams by buying football team clothing.
Many people who travel often by train do so as part of their job, and thus do not own a railway season ticket because their company is paying their travelling costs. Others travel frequently by train, but not frequently enough to make it worthwhile to purchase a season ticket. Conversely, many people who do not travel frequently by train do actually possess a railway season ticket. Many people purchase a season ticket and then, due to changes in circumstances, later may use the railways less frequently. Other people find it cost-effective to purchase a season ticket, even though they do not use the railways very often. 
